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Abstract 
The July 31st Elections  in  Zimbabwe  ushered  in  a  renewed  period  of  political 
domination by ZANU(PF) and its President, Robert Mugabe. This election followed ﬁve 
years of a SADC- facilitated Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was put into place 
after a contested presidential run-off election in June 2008. The recent elections, which 
once again established ZANU(PF)’s mastery over the country’s political domain, were 
passed as free and peaceful by SADC and the African Union but contested by both 
Movement for Democratic Change parties and the western countries. While there were 
clear problems in the process leading to the election, it is also apparent that this was 
not the only factor that determined ZANU(PF)’S ‘victory’. This article provides an 
analysis of the multiple factors that contributed to the current conjuncture including 
the different party strategies under the GPA, changes in Zimbabwe’s political economy 
and interventions at regional and international levels. 
 
Introduction1 
Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA), signed by the then ruling ZANU(PF) and 
the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change parties, 2  was intended to 
prepare the political process for a generally acceptable election after the violent debacle of 
the June 2008 presidential run-off elections, which had followed ZANU(PF)’s defeat in 
the March 2008 polls. The GPA was marked by severe contestations all too 
characteristic of the battle for the state that constituted the politics of the agreement. 
At almost every stage of the implementation of the agreement, intense conﬂicts over its 
interpretation left their debris on the political terrain, at the heart of which was the 
meaning of ‘sovereignty’.3  Within this context, the major aim of ZANU(PF)’s strategy was to 
manipulate and stall the reform provisions in the GPA in order to allow it to regroup 
                                                 
1 This introduction and the section on the constitution draw from B. Raftopoulos, ‘Towards another stalemate in Zimbabwe?’, 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), October 2012. 
2 ZANU(PF) is the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), Zimbabwe’s ruling party from 1980 until the advent of the 
GPA. The MDC is the Movement for Democratic Change, formed in 1999. It split into two formations in 2005, the larger MDC-
Tsvangirai or MDC-T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and the smaller MDC, led at first by Arthur Mutambara and then by Welshman 
Ncube. 
3 As I have written elsewhere: ‘On the one hand, the MDC, formed in the post-1989 global era of a dominant liberal democratic 
discourse based its legitimacy on the sovereignty of the electoral process, constitutionalism and a broad human rights foundation. 
On the other hand, ZANU(PF), although formally adhering to regular elections, based its legitimacy largely on the legacies of the 
liberation struggle, a highly problematic redistributive land agenda from 2000, and a dominant ethos of force and coercion which 
characterised most of the electoral processes in the post-colonial period’. B. Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the Politics of the 
Global Political Agreement: National Conflict, Regional Agony, and International Dilemma’, in B. Raftopoulos (ed.), The Hard 
Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (Weaver Press, Harare, 2013), p. 7. 
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and reconﬁgure its political resources after plunging to the nadir of its legitimacy in the 
2008 electoral defeat. 
 
The resounding electoral ‘victory’ of Mugabe and his party ZANU(PF) in 2013 can in 
part be explained by the impact of the continuing legacies of ZANU(PF)’s authoritarian 
politics. However, this alone is not sufﬁcient to explain the outcome of these elections. 
The objective of this paper is to look beyond this important dimension of ZANU(PF)’s 
politics and to place this factor within a broader understanding of other determinants of 
the election outcome. These additional determinants include changes in Zimbabwe’s 
political economy since 2000, the challenges and limitations of the political opposition, 
as well as the regional and international inﬂuences on the elections. Moreover, the events 
of 31 July 2013 represent not simply a return to certain continuities of ZANU(PF) rule, 
but also a reconstitution of the political terrain in Zimbabwe, particularly around the 
immediate future of opposition politics in the country, and the possible implications of 
the Zimbabwean experience for regional politics. 
 
The Constitutional Process 
Between 2009 and 2013 a key area of contestation between the parties to the GPA was 
the struggle for constitutional reform. Article VI of the agreement set out the 
‘fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution for 
themselves’, also stipulating that the process would be carried out by a Select 
Committee of Parliament composed of parties to the GPA. Constitutional reform is often 
a highly contested process with different parties bringing different political agendas and 
competing imaginaries to the process. Zimbabwe was no exception to this trend and since 
the 1990s the major political parties often fought out their rival positions on this terrain. 
 
For the nationalists coming out of the liberation struggle, constitutionalism and the law 
have had a complicated history. On the one hand, these discourses were constitutive of 
their grievances against the colonial state and helped to conceptualise their own 
legality and legitimacy. They have also played an important role in both delineating 
their demands and providing a means of imagining the possible forms of a future state.4 
On the other hand, this generation of leaders also viewed the liberation struggle as an 
alternative to constitutionalism, with the war of liberation leading to the destruction of the 
colonial state and the establishment of ‘people’s power’, however nebulously deﬁned.5  
 
The constitutional compromises agreed at Lancaster House in 1979 were the result of a 
convergence of national, regional and international pressures that inaugurated the 
politics of the postcolonial state. Once in power, ZANU(PF), as in the case of other 
postcolonial political parties, instrumentalised the constitution to concentrate power in 
the Presidency and to reconstruct the power relations between the state and opposition 
politics in the state’s favour. 
 
                                                 
4J. Alexander, ‘Nationalism and Self-Government in Rhodesian Detention: Gonakudzingwa, 1964 – 1974’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 37, 2 (2011), pp. 551– 69. 
5 I. Mandaza, ‘Movements for National Liberation and Constitutionalism in Southern Africa’, in Issa Shivji (ed.), State and 
Constitutionalism: An African Debate (SAPES Books, Harare, 1991), pp. 71 – 90. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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The different voices of opposition politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe have also 
constituted their presence through the discourse of constitutionalism. The emergence of 
the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in the late 1990s represented a convergence 
of a critique of the ZANU(PF) state around the issues of political democratisation and 
economic change, constructed through the organisational frameworks of the churches, 
the emerging human rights organisations, and the labour movement. As the 
constitutional movement gained momentum between the late 1990s and into the 2000s, 
the dominance of the human rights messaging took precedence over economic issues, a 
shift that contributed to the rupture between rights and redistributive issues that has 
continued to mark the political discourse in the country. This emphasis on the part of the 
constitutional movement was the result of the mobilisation of a coalition of classes and 
organisations largely in the urban areas around the lack of accountability of the 
postcolonial state, in the context of the post-1989 changes in global politics and the 
dominant paradigm of human rights, democratisation and economic neo-liberalism that 
framed western interventions in the South from this period. This convergence of factors 
led to ZANU(PF)’s construction of the constitutional movement as a western 
intervention, completely ignoring both the national conditions that gave rise to its 
existence and the longer history of activism around human rights and constitutional 
issues that marked anti-colonial struggles in the country. The politics of the land 
occupation movement in the 2000s profoundly marked the bifurcation between questions 
of human rights and economic redistribution.6  
 
With the signing of the GPA in 2008, constitutional reform became one of the major 
issues of contention between the parties. After three years of delays, obstructions, 
logistical and ﬁnancial squabbles, and a problematic outreach programme, a draft 
constitution was produced through the Parliamentary Select Committee process, 
COPAC, in July 2012. Importantly in terms of the process, all parties to the agreement 
were signatories to the draft, leading to the logical conclusion that at all times the 
principals of the parties and their respective leaderships were fully informed of the 
discussions of the COPAC team. 
 
However, in a move that replicated previous interventions to block constitutional reform 
and eschew its commitment to the GPA, ZANU(PF) placed another obstacle in the path 
of the reform process. In August 2012 President Mugabe presented  the  leaders  of  the 
MDC formations with a ZANU(PF) redraft of the COPAC draft, on the grounds that the 
latter was drafted in opposition to the ‘views of the people’ gathered during the 
outreach process. This redraft, described by ZANU(PF) as ‘non-negotiable’, attempted 
to undo the COPAC process, undermine the GPA and once again force the 
Zimbabwean citizenry into a national election without a new constitution. Moreover, 
the ZANU(PF) draft effectively dismissed the major reforms included in the COPAC 
draft and proposed a return to the kind of executive powers and party-state rule that 
ZANU(PF) had crafted since 1980. 
 
                                                 
6 E. McCandless, ‘Zimbabwean Forms of Resistance: Social Movements, Strategic Dilemmas and Transformative Change’ (PhD 
Thesis, American University, 2005); S. Rich Dorman, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe’ (DPhil Thesis, 
University of Oxford, 2001). See also T. Ranger (ed.), The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe, 
Volume Two: Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2001). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Both MDC formations objected strongly to the ZANU(PF) position. After weeks of 
political haggling, the parties, under pressure from the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) facilitation team, agreed to take the COPAC draft to an 
All Stakeholders Conference held in October 2012. The few disagreements on the draft 
that resulted from the Conference were ﬁnally resolved by the party principals in January 
2013 and, by Presidential Proclamation, 16 July was set aside as the day that a 
referendum would be held on the constitutional draft. While the draft was a 
compromise document which still contained a disturbing concentration of executive 
powers, it also put in place important changes such as presidential term limits, more 
accountability of the security and judicial services, a more independent  national  
prosecuting  authority,  limited  devolution  of  power,  and  stronger citizenship rights. 
 
The NCA, which had opposed the COPAC process, ﬁled an application to the High Court in 
February 2013 seeking an order interdicting the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) 
from conducting the referendum. The NCA sought the court order on the grounds that 
the Proclamation should be declared unlawful and ultra vires Section 3 of the 
Referendum Act Chapter 2:10. Predictably, the High Court rejected the NCA case ‘in its 
entirety’, stating that the President’s conduct was ‘not subject to review by a court’.7  
 
The referendum went ahead on 16 March 2013, with the overwhelming majority of 
voters, 3,079,966, voting for the new constitution, while a small number, 179,489, 
voted against. The total number of votes cast was 3,259,454.8 The referendum vote 
recorded the largest voter turnout in the postcolonial period, with marked increases in 
each province in comparison with the March 2008 elections. Harare and the three 
Mashonaland provinces recorded the largest turnouts, while the Southern Matabeleland 
regions recorded the lowest.9 The major reasons for the large voter turnout included 
the broad consensus of the GPA parties on the draft constitution, the relaxed voting 
requirements and less complex voting procedures, and the ‘relatively prevailing peaceful 
political  engagements’. 10   The large voter turnout also gave an indication that 
ZANU(PF) was mobilising its support base in preparation for the general elections, and 
that the party had been steadily registering voters in preparation for this forthcoming 
event. One could also speculate that the extent of the vote may also have pointed to 
exhaustion on the part of the electorate with the continuing political impasse in the 
country and the persistent economic challenges it presented over the years. 
 
The Possibility of Regional and International Consensus in the 
Interregnum between the Referendum and the Election 
In the aftermath of the referendum there appeared to be a growing consensus between 
SADC, the EU and to a lesser extent the US on the way forward. SADC commended 
Zimbabwe for holding a ‘credible, free and fair constitutional referendum’, and urged the 
GPA parties once again to ‘ﬁnalise the outstanding issues in the implementation of the 
GPA and preparations for holding free and fair elections in Zimbabwe’.11 Two months 
                                                 
7 Constitution Watch 11/2013, 2 March 2013. Constitution Watch is a bulletin produced by Veritas Zimbabwe, and available online 
at http://www.veritaszim.net/constitutionwatch 
8 Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin, ‘Zimbabwe Resoundingly Votes for a New Constitution’, 19 March 2013. 
9 Electoral Resource Centre, “ ‘Miracle Votes’ – An Analysis of the March 2013 Referendum.” March 2013. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The report of the SADC Facilitator on the Zimbabwe Inter-Party Political Dialogue, His Excellency, President of 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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before this, a Friends of Zimbabwe meeting held in London and attended by several EU 
members, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia as well as the parties to the GPA, also 
issued a statement of encouragement in response to the success of the referendum. The 
statement welcomed and supported SADC’s lead role as guarantor of the GPA, noted 
the ‘breakthrough of the constitutional referendum’ and re-emphasised western support 
to SADC ‘in their efforts to facilitate the GPA and the roadmap for elections’.12  
 
In May 2013, a ‘Quick Policy Insight’ paper from the European Parliament reached out 
further to SADC and to the GPA parties providing a critical perspective on both 
ZANU(PF) and the MDC and stressing the need for building stronger political 
institutions. The statement read: 
 
Government turnover does not guarantee democratic change in Zimbabwe. 
ZANU(PF) lacks democratic roots; but the MDC has, for its part, done little to prove 
its trustworthiness. Rather than asking who is in power, international analysts might 
want to put a stronger focus on how to actually improve Zimbabwe’s political culture 
and institutions.13  
 
In addition the document warned that: 
foreign actors need to be aware of the high degree of suspicion prevalent in 
Zimbabwe. The international community should act with great care to avoid 
unintentionally causing a counterproductive backlash.14  
 
In addition to these overtures to SADC and the Inclusive Government, the Danish 
government had, in March 2013, stated that its position towards Zimbabwe was that ‘the 
risks of not engaging in the current crucial transition process [are] greater than the risk 
of engaging’.15 The IMF, for its part, had in June of 2013 approved a Staff-Monitored 
Programme for Zimbabwe covering the period April– December 2013, in which it 
would support the Zimbabwean authorities’ ‘comprehensive adjustment and reform 
programme’. This would in turn be an ‘important stepping stone towards helping 
Zimbabwe re-engage with the international community’.16  
 
Thus, by the end of June 2013 there was a growing consensus between SADC and the 
EU in particular about the success of the referendum and the need for generally 
acceptable free and fair elections, even if this was underlined by nagging doubts about 
the possibility of such an outcome. The EU linked its re-engagement to the 
management of the forthcoming elections, and stated that it was ‘ready to engage with 
whatever government that is formed as a result of peaceful, transparent and credible 
                                                                                                                                                                
the Republic of South Africa, President Jacob Zuma, to the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 
Pretoria, South Africa, 9 March 2013. 
12 Friends of Zimbabwe communique´, London, 26 March 2013. The delegations to the meeting included: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. 
13 European Parliament, Director-General for External Policies, ‘Zimbabwe’s 2013 general elections: A genuine wind of change?’ 
DG EXPO/B/Pol Dep/Note/ 2013, 28 May 2013. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, DANIDA, ‘Denmark – Zimbabwe Partnership Policy 2013 – 2015’, March 
2013. 
16 International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Managing Director Approves a Staff Monitored Programme for Zimbabwe’, Press Release 
No. 13/174, 13 June 2013. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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elections’.17 The US, as it did throughout the period of the GPA,18 took a harder line, 
stating that while it applauded the holding of a successful referendum, it urged the 
Zimbabwe government to welcome both domestic and international observers to 
monitor the elections. This position, set out by US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
Johnny Carson, earned an immediate rebuke from the Zimbabwean presidential 
spokesperson for putting forward such ‘obnoxious’ conditions.19 Notwithstanding the 
US position, there appeared to be an increasing convergence between SADC and the 
west on the need for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe, an emerging consensus that 
had, by mid-2013, already pushed the EU into a substantive movement away from the 
‘sanctions’ measures imposed by the Mugabe regime from the early 2000s. However, 
as will be discussed further below,  this  seeming  convergence  barely  concealed  the  
tensions  and  contradictions  in  the discourses on transition at play between and 
sometimes within these groups. 
 
The Election Process 
As he had done prior to the 2008 election, in contravention of the GPA, Mugabe proceeded 
to take a unilateral position on the setting of the election date. Notwithstanding the 
unﬁnished reform agenda set out in the GPA, and against the persistent 
recommendations of several SADC fora on the need for a full implementation of the 
GPA before an election, Mugabe and his party set in train a series of processes that 
would once again imperil the SADC facilitation process in Zimbabwe. On 2 May 2013 
Mr Jealousy Mawarire, the Director of the Centre for Democracy in Southern Africa, 
and widely believed to be working for ZANU(PF), ﬁled an urgent application to the 
Supreme Court seeking an order directing the President to proclaim elections to be held 
no later than 30 June. Mawarire made his claim under section 18 of the old 
Constitution. By the time the matter came to court it was heard by the Constitutional 
Court which was set up under the new constitution, the composition of which was 
largely inﬂuenced by ZANU(PF). Predictably, by a majority decision, the Court 
supported Mawarire’s claim but stated that the election date should be set for 31 July. 
 
This controversial legal decision20 allowed ZANU(PF) to push ahead with its preferred 
date for the election, largely bypassing the requirements for consultation with other 
parties to the GPA and the SADC demands for the full  implementation  of  the  
agreement before elections. The immediate response of Lindiwe Zulu from the SADC 
facilitation team was that: 
 
With or without the court ruling, we are going ahead to meet the parties as the facilitation 
team ahead of the SADC summit, which [decision] was agreed on in Addis Ababa. All 
parties have been invited. As the facilitator put it at the summit, we want the comfort 
of having a clear roadmap to the elections, with timelines agreed upon by the parties 
                                                 
17 Report of the Delegation of the Development Committee of the European Parliament to Zimbabwe (29 April –3 
May 2013), 3 July 2013. 
18 Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the Politics of the Global Political Agreement’. 
19 ‘US Seek to Observe Zimbabwe Elections’, The Zimbabwe Mail. Retrieved 8 April 2013 from http://www. 
thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/16751-us-seek-to-observe-zimbabwe-elections.html. 
20 For one of the many discussions of this decision by civic groups in Zimbabwe see D. Matyszak, ‘“Before and After”: Old Wine 
in New Bottles: The Constitutional Court Ruling on the Election Date’, Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, 3 June 2013. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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themselves. The ultimate is to have credible elections. We want to avoid the 2008 
scenario.21  
 
Zulu’s statement resulted in a hail of invective from ZANU(PF) spokespersons that 
continued past attacks on her and was a prelude to a major verbal assault by Mugabe 
himself. Party ideologue Jonathan Moyo, drawing on the language of sovereignty 
and constitutionalism, called Zulu’s comments an ‘attack on our national sovereignty’ 
and called on Zimbabweans to ‘oppose and reject this patronizing and illegitimate 
posturing by our neighbours’.22 Despite these attacks, Zuma’s report to the SADC Troika 
on the 15 June reiterated the concerns of Zulu’s position. Noting that most of the areas 
agreed to by the GPA parties in July 2011 under the framework of ‘Zimbabwe Elections 
Road Map and Timelines’ had not been ‘adequately implemented’, Zuma reported that the 
proposal to hold the elections on 31 July ‘is fraught with legal contestation, political 
dispute and heightened tensions even within the Inclusive Government’.23  
 
At the SADC summit held in Maputo on 15 June 2013, the regional group endorsed 
the report  of  the  facilitator  but  acknowledged  the  ruling  of  the  Constitutional  
Court. It recommended that the government of Zimbabwe engage the Constitutional 
Court to seek more time ‘beyond the 31 July deadline’ for holding the Harmonised 
Elections.24 It was very clear  that  SADC,  notwithstanding  the  warnings  from  Zuma’s  
report,  was  bending  to Mugabe’s strategy, deferring once again  to the issue of 
sovereignty around the Court decision. The Executive Secretary of SADC, Tomaz 
Saloma˜ o, made it clear after the Maputo summit that ‘decisions of the courts are to be 
respected’.25 The African Union (AU) Chair Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma took the same 
position, also expressing the need to respect the rule of law and the judiciary.26  
 
Following the summit, ZANU(PF) made a court appeal for an extension of the election 
date, which was designed to fail and which was submitted without consulting the two 
MDCs. Predictably, the Constitutional Court denied the appeal and the election date of 31 
July was conﬁrmed, in the face of a clear lack of preparedness for the elections. As the 
International Crisis Group reported, the voters’ roll was in a shambles, the security 
forces remained unreformed, the public media was grossly imbalanced, the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission (ZEC) was underfunded and lacked time for preparation, and the 
ZEC had failed to provide an electronic voters’ roll to all candidates before the election 
in breach of Section 21 of the Electoral Act. Moreover, the voter registration process was 
‘hampered by resource restrictions, showed bias against the registration in the cities, 
especially Harare, and ended on 10 July amid protests’. 27  This lack of preparedness 
                                                 
21 D. Sibanda and E. Mushava, ‘Roadmap Will Decide Polls – Zuma’, News Day, 5 June 2013. Retrieved 6 June 2013 from 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/06/05/roadmap-will-decide-polls-zuma/. 
22 ‘Moyo and Mutambara Blasts Zuma’, The Zimbabwe Mail, 6 June 2013. Retrieved 6 June 2013 from 
http://bepa.co.zw/news/latest/the-zimbabwe-mail/moyo-and-mutambara-blasts-zuma/1dl6b.119272. 
23 Report of the SADC Facilitator, His Excellency, President of the Republic of South Africa, President Jacob Zuma, at the SADC 
Extra-Ordinary Summit, Maputo, Mozambique, 15 June 2013. 
24 Communique´: SADC Maputo meeting on DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, Maputo, 15 June 2013. 
25 ‘Elections: SADC will Respect Court Appeal Ruling’, New Zimbabwe, 17 June 2013. Retrieved 18 June 2013 from 
www.newzimbabwe.com/news-11438-ElectionsþSADC þ will þ respect þ appeal þ ruling/news.aspx. 
26 ‘AU Chief Wades into Election Date Row’, New Zimbabwe, 17 June 2013. Retrieved 17 June 2013 from 
www.newzimbabwe.com/news-11431-AUþchief þ wades þ into þ election þ date þ row/news.aspx. 
27 International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s Elections: Mugabe’s Last Stand’, Africa Briefing No. 95, Johannesburg/Brussels, 29 
July 2013. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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continued to be of concern to the SADC facilitation team, with Lindiwe Zulu once again 
voicing her concerns after the chaotic process surrounding the special vote organised for 
police in mid-July, which had been designed to allow police who would be on duty on 31 
July to vote early. Zulu observed that, ‘We are concerned because things on the ground 
are not looking good’, stating also that Zuma had called Mugabe to tell him that he was 
not pleased with the run-up to the poll.28  
 
Mugabe responded angrily to Zulu’s statement, hurling insults at her: ‘An ordinary 
woman says “no you can’t have elections on July 31”. Really, did such a person think we, 
as a country, would take heed of this street woman’s utterances?’29  Moreover, in yet 
another display of political brinkmanship, Mugabe threatened to withdraw from SADC 
if the organisation ‘decides to do stupid things’. The South African Presidency 
immediately issued a statement distancing itself from Zulu’s comments and denying 
any reports that Zuma had been in touch with Mugabe about election preparations.30 
There were reports that at this time SADC facilitators offered support to the MDC-T if 
it were to withdraw from the election until the GPA had been more fully implemented. 
Moore’s assessment is that the MDC-T debated the offer and rejected it on the grounds 
that there was unlikely to be a repeat of the violence of the 2008 presidential run-off in 
the context of the GPA and the forthcoming tourism conference in Victoria Falls, and 
that under these conditions the MDC-T would be victorious. 31  However, it is still 
unclear whether this offer was ever on the table, as both Morgan Tsvangirai and 
Tendai Biti deny ever receiving such a formal offer.32 
 
After a protracted process of facilitation and the contested and frustrating 
experience of the Inclusive Government, the Harmonised Elections went ahead on 31 
July 2013. Although there were clear indications that, once again, the MDCs faced 
major obstacles in the elections, the extent of ZANU(PF)’s ‘victory’ shocked many 
observers. In the presidential vote, Mugabe received 61%, compared to the 44% he had 
won in 2008; Tsvangirai’s vote plunged from 48% in 2008 to 33% in 2013. In terms of 
parliamentary seats, ZANU(PF) increased its number from 99 seats in 2008 to 159 in 
2013, while the MDC-T’s number dropped from 99 seats in 2008 (with the smaller 
MDC formation winning 10 seats) to 49 in 2013. Moreover, the total number of votes 
counted increased by 25% between 2008 and 2013, with ZANU(PF)’s share of the vote 
increasing by 83% between these dates, while the percentage won by the MDC-T 
dropped by 2% in this period.33  
 
The response of the regional and continental bodies to the elections was 
unanimously favourable, unlike their position in the discredited 2008 plebiscite. 
SADC declared the poll ‘free, peaceful and generally credible’, notwithstanding its 
unwillingness to pronounce it ‘fair’ because of the absence of an electronic copy of the 
                                                 
28 P. Govender, ‘Zimbabwe Election “Not Looking Good”, South Africa’, Reuters, 18 July 2013. Retrieved 22 July 2013 from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/us-zimbabwe-election-idUSBRE96H0S820130718. 
29 S. Ngalwa, ‘Zuma’s Envoy Shrugs off Bob’s Street Slur’, Sunday Times, 7 July 2013. 
30 ‘South Africa Regrets Unauthorized Statements on Zimbabwe’, Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 21 July 2013. 
Retrieved 21 July 2013 from http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid¼15771. 
31 D. Moore, ‘Zimbabwe’s Democrats: A Luta Perdido - E reinı´cio’, Solidarity Peace Trust, 4 September 2013. Retrieved 11 
October 2013 from www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1330/zimbabwe-democrats-a-luta-perdido-ereinicio/. 
32 Discussion with the author at the MDC-T’s NSC Strategic Planning Retreat, Harare, 12 September 2013. 
33 Solidarity Peace Trust, ‘The End of a Road: The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe’, Johannesburg, October 2013, p. 45. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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voters’ roll. 34  The AU commended Zimbabwe for ‘a generally peaceful campaign’, 
observing that ‘from an historical perspective and in comparison to the 2008 elections, 
Zimbabwe has made an important transition in the conduct of its elections’.35 Jacob 
Zuma expressed his ‘profound congratulations’ to Mugabe and urged all parties in 
Zimbabwe to ‘accept the outcome of the elections as  election observers reported it to be 
an expression of the will of the people’.36 The only dissenting voice in SADC was 
Botswana, which called for an independent audit of the electoral process.37 However, as 
in the past, Botswana’s dissent was soon brought to heel within the solidarity 
framework of SADC, and the body went further to elect Mugabe its Deputy Chairperson 
at its Malawi summit in August 2013. 
 
While the SADC and  AU position  was endorsed by the Chinese  and  Russian 
governments, the elections received endorsement neither from the EU nor the US, 
with both expressing doubts about its free and fair status, and with the latter making 
it clear that US sanctions would continue. The UN commended a ‘broadly peaceful 
election day’,  but stressed that concerns about certain aspects of the election process 
should be pursued through established   channels.38  
 
The MDC formations and the major civic bodies rejected the legitimacy of the 
elections, claiming election fraud. Mugabe’s immediate response to this challenge was 
less than gracious: 
 
Those who cannot accept defeat are wasting their time. They can even go hang if they 
want, but even dogs will not sniff at their corpses . . . . We voted democratically. We 
brought democracy. We have delivered democracy on a platter. If they do not want to 
take it, let it be, but the people have delivered it.39  
 
After an initial threat to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court, Tsvangirai 
dropped the action and both MDC parties decided not to challenge the results any further 
in the courts. 
 
Explaining the Election Results 
While there were always clear indications that the MDCs would continue to face major 
challenges in attempting to defeat ZANU(PF) at the polls, the sheer scale of ZANU(PF)’s 
victory left many Zimbabweans and political observers stunned. In explaining the 
victory, three areas need to be analysed: the strategies of ZANU(PF) in the context of the 
                                                 
34 SADC, ‘Summary Statement of the SADC Election Observation Mission to the Harmonised Elections in the Republic of 
Zimbabwe held on 31 July 2013’, 2 August 2013. 
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transformed political economy of Zimbabwe; the weaknesses of the MDC formations; and 
the politics of SADC, the EU and US. 
 
The Strategies of ZANU(PF) 
Much of the commentary on the election results from the MDCs and the civic movement 
has concentrated on the violations of the electoral law both before and during the 
election process. Most of these factors have already been referred to above. Added to 
these it is clear that ZANU(PF) systematically blocked the central reforms of the GPA 
throughout the period of the Inclusive Government.40 Even as ZANU(PF) largely kept 
the energies of the MDCs concentrated on the single issues of constitutional reform, the 
former concentrated its activities on election preparations from early on in the GPA. 
ZANU(PF) also dealt at least temporarily with some of the divisions within the party 
that had led to the emergence of Simba Makoni and his party Mavambo in 2008, a 
development that had contributed to the defeat of ZANU(PF) and Mugabe. The decision 
to abolish the District Development Committee structures of the party in mid-2012 in 
the wake of the serious divisions the structures were causing in the selection of 
electoral party candidates, proved once again the capacity of the central leadership, with 
the organisational legacy of ‘democratic centralism’, to either ‘guide’ or do away with 
such structures when it was considered necessary.41 This strategy was combined from 
late 2012 with the systematic arrest and harassment of civil society leaders monitoring 
and documenting human rights violations, providing psycho-social and legal support to 
victims, and those working on voter registration and voter mobilisation. These strategies 
of reform blockage and civic intimidation were combined with the ‘harvest of fear’ drawing 
on the memories of the brutalities of the 2008 election.42 Thus, the long history of 
authoritarian nationalism and state brutality has continued to play a major, if 
differentiated, role in the country’s politics. 
 
However, it is also clear that Mugabe and his party have retained a substantial social base 
in the country, as was evidenced even during the generally accepted ﬁrst round of 
the Harmonised Elections in March 2008. Moreover the maintenance of this social base 
has not been based solely on violence and coercion but on a combination of the 
ideological legacies of the liberation struggle, the persistent memories of colonial 
dispossession, and the land reform process. As Fontein has written, while the 
authoritarian turn in Zimbabwean politics has excluded such groups as the urban poor, 
farm workers, women and white commercial 
 
farmers, ‘it did simultaneously manage to appeal to some . . . localised aspirations which 
have been thwarted since 1980’.43 As Fontein observes, ‘the redistribution of land to the 
landless, however corrupt, politicised and indeed violent the process may have been, 
[and] the increasing involvement of both war veterans and traditional leaders in local 
                                                 
40 See Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the Politics of the Global Political Agreement’, for details on this issue. 
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political structures ... were very astute political moves’.44 This social base has been 
renewed and expanded within the context of the radical changes in Zimbabwe’s political 
economy since 2000. The deconstruction of former white-owned, large-scale farms and 
their replacement by a preponderance of small farm holders has radically changed the 
social and political relations on the land. Following the land redistribution process, 
70% of the land is now held by small farm producers, 13% by middle-scale farmers, and 
11% by large farms and estates. This ‘re-peasantisation’ has resulted in changes  in wealth 
distribution from a landed racial minority to ‘mostly landless and land-poor’ classes.45 
Moreover, these changes on the land have created a new ‘entrepreneurial dynamism’ and 
‘productive potential’, resulting in new areas of economic activity with novel marketing 
and value chains. It is still unclear, as Scoones et al. argue, whether these restructured 
relations on the land will be dominated by patronage relations with the ZANU(PF) state 
or become the source of sustainable livelihoods.46 Zamchiya formulates this problematic 
differently, observing that the ability to develop sustainable livelihoods with favourable 
access to labour, farming inputs and land with valuable export crops in the newly 
resettled areas was decisively shaped by the relations of different farmers to political 
patronage.47  
 
The new forms in which ZANU(PF) and its state organs have penetrated these social 
relations have affected the forms of ZANU(PF) dominance in these areas. Different forms 
of governmentality have developed in the resettled areas, characterised by what Murisa 
calls the ‘fusion of traditional and modern institutions, which bring together customary 
and popular political functionaries to serve on the same platforms’. Through these 
structures ZANU(PF) has channelled various rural programmes and forms of 
patronage appealing to popular demands around irrigation, farms inputs, marketing of 
products, education and electriﬁcation in the rural areas, even as it formally signed up to 
the more neo-liberal economic programmes agreed upon by the Inclusive Government.48 
However, Murisa also warns that the increasing move towards reinstituting traditional 
authorities resembles the colonial state practices of imposed traditional structures.49 
This is a reminder, as Partha Chatterjee warns, that ‘while many of the techniques of 
power adopted by the postcolonial state were the same techniques deployed in the  
colonial period,  the ideological ground  of justiﬁcation  was now  anti- imperialist’.50 
However, it is also clear from Alexander’s work that for a century the relations 
 
between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, ‘customary rule’ and ‘bureaucratic practice’ have been 
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interesting precisely because of the ‘negotiated terms by which authority was constructed 
and power exercised’. Thus it is difﬁcult to make any assumptions about either site of 
rule in terms of its democratic content, representativeness, or relationship with the state 
on the basis of its ‘traditionality’ or ‘modernity’.51  
 
The development of ZANU(PF)’s social base was also visible in the rapid growth of the 
informal mining sector. In the 1990s this sector was in its incipient form and was not an 
area that ZANU(PF) actively cultivated. As Yeros noted, gold panners in this period lacked 
access to channels of political representation and were largely ‘unorganised and 
unrepresented’.52 However, by the 2000s this sector grew rapidly within the context of the 
fast growing mining sector, whose contribution to the GDP grew from 3.2% in 2008 to 
9.5 % in 2010, reaching 13% by 2012, with the mineral sector accounting for 73% of the 
country’s total exports.53 This growth led Mawowa to conclude that the government’s 
policy emphasis on the centrality of the peasantry and subsistence farming in the rural 
areas may have masked the reality of the dominance of the mining sector, in which small-
scale mining, largely carried out (71%) by young men under 35, accounted for 40% of 
total output.54  
 
As the mining sector became the most important area of accumulation and patronage in 
the shrinking crisis economy, the Zimbabwean state compromised with large mining 
companies like Zimplats and allowed it to operate in the country on very favourable 
terms. In the case of Zimplats, the company was allowed direct access to foreign 
currency and an exemption from surrender requirements imposed on other exporters, as 
well as the right to conduct most of its ﬁnancial transactions outside the country. This 
effectively ‘insulated it from Zimbabwe’s hyperinﬂation and the collapsed national 
payment system’.55 This accommodation with foreign capital can also be seen in the 
policy on land where, by 2009, 1.7 million hectares of land was being utilised by a 
combination of agro-industrial plantations, conservancies and mining farmlands owned 
by transnational corporations and focused on export production.56  
 
Thus, as Martens observes, under the Inclusive Government, the Ministry of Mines, led 
by a ZANU(PF) minister, reversed its 2008 policy of clamping down on illegal mining 
and sought to extend its support to this sector. It was little wonder then, that the 
Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Council (ZASMC), representing 25,000 
small-scale miners, welcomed ZANU(PF)’s victory in 2013.57 Mawowa clearly sums up 
the political implications of these changes in the mining sector: 
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As the economic situation worsened, the party-state patronage system has become more 
entrenched. This has become clearer with the indigenization and empowerment policy 
where party afﬁliation is the single most important criterion for access to state-
mediated economic opportunities. The party manifests itself as a localized capitalist 
oligarchy . . . . The patronage accumulation attending this period has however not 
excluded possibilities for upward mobility among the somewhat independent miners. It 
is these possibilities that suggest that, in spite of Zimbabwe’s serious economic crisis, 
some things continued to work and indeed as formality declined, new accumulation 
paths emerged.58  
 
The emergence of this ‘shadow economy’ has not undermined the existence of the central 
state’s authority, but instead the state has adapted to the economic changes through a 
system of patronage that ‘relies on several conduits of coercive power’ that, though not 
always coordinated, subordinate themselves to the centrality of the party and the 
state.59 This analysis of the changing forms of state authority accords with McGregor’s 
excellent analysis of the reconﬁguration of the state on the Zambezi frontier during the 
period of the Zimbabwe crisis. McGregor describes how the changes in livelihood on this  
frontier blurred the boundaries between legal and illegal activities, with unregulated 
activities becoming enmeshed with bureaucratic controls and state agents.60 The long-
term results of this artisanal and small-scale mining is not yet clear, but in the short 
term its developmental potential appears to be very fragile, and where mining was 
once a driver of urbanisation in the Zimbabwean economy, in the post-2000 period 
mining towns became ‘havens for internally displaced persons’.61  
 
In addition to mobilising among the informal sector miners and controlling the revenues 
from the diamond mines in Chiadzwa,62 ZANU(PF) also stepped up its mobilisation 
efforts within the increasingly informalised urban sector. The informal sector had 
displaced manufacturing to become the second largest employer in the economy by 
2011, with the largest number of informal-sector employees working in the wholesale and 
retail trade, and in motor-vehicle and motorcycle repairs.63 In Zimbabwe, as in other 
postcolonial states, what Denning has called ‘the spectre of wageless life’ is viewed no 
longer as a temporary condition, but increasingly as the ‘main mode of existence in a 
separate, almost autonomous economy’. 64  With the shrinking of formal sector 
employment in the economy generally, and in manufacturing in the urban areas in 
particular, the rate of unionisation also declined from 200,000 in 1990 to 197,000 in 
1997, and to 162,000 in 2013. Thus, the rate of unionisation to estimated total 
employment in the formal sector has ranged from around 13 – 16% between the years 
1990 and 2013.65 These ﬁgures on unionisation should be treated with great care. They 
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represent the formal registered membership numbers with the labour centre and are 
unlikely to represent the weakened state of actual union representation at shop-ﬂoor level 
as a result of shrinking formal employment in the private sector, and the decreased 
inﬂuence of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions since the late 1990s. This falling 
level of unionisation and the growing informalisation of the economy have undermined 
the effectiveness of tripartite industrial relations structures and increased the avenues for 
dealing with labour issues through more informalised structures with greater 
vulnerability to the political inﬂuences of ZANU(PF). 
 
Thus, just as the forms of rule have changed in the rural governance structures, so have 
they been affected in the governance and administration of urban labour relations. The 
trade unions, which were the most effective mobilisation base for the MDC-T in the late 
1990s, have been severely weakened by a combination of shrinking formal 
employment, state coercion, weakening organisational capacity, splits in the central 
labour federation and loss of leadership to the party political sphere. As the strength of 
Tsvangirai’s party weakened in this area, ZANU(PF) escalated its interventions with 
urbanites at local government level. As McGregor observes, ZANU(PF) has relied on 
‘coercive measures and irregular enticements to maintain the local state as a system of 
patronage when challenged under the Inclusive Government’. Moreover, the 
privatisation and deregulation of local authority controls ‘provided opportunities and 
resources to fuel ZANU(PF) accumulation and patronage through party-linked 
business’.66 With little to offer in terms of new employment opportunities, ZANU(PF), 
building on the blockages they had built to the few attempts made by the MDC to 
improve the extremely poor state of municipal government inherited by the Inclusive 
Government, made a populist decision to cancel all outstanding rate payments a week 
before the 2013 elections. As one of its election posters read: 
 
COUNCIL BILLS CANCELLED. ZANU(PF) says yes MDC says no. Dollarisation led to 
unfairly high outstanding bills, ZANU(PF) understands that people are struggling and 
that’s why we have cleared your bills.67  
 
Once again, ZANU(PF) combined its formal afﬁliation to stabilisation measures under 
the Inclusive Government with populist electoral interventions, with little regard for 
the longer-term implications of such measures. The cumulative messaging of these 
ZANU(PF) policy interventions was brought together in the party’s election manifesto, 
which was entitled ‘Indigenise, Empower, Develop and  create  Employment’.  The  key  
themes  of this manifesto included ZANU(PF)’s monopoly claim to have: delivered 
liberation from colonial rule and carried  out  the  ‘Third  Chimurenga’  of  land  
redistribution;  provided the guardianship of national sovereignty and identity; 
guaranteed freedom, democracy, non-violence and peace; embarked on a new 
programme of indigenisation to increase popular ownership of  national  resources;  
and  provided  growth  and  employment.68 As Mugabe looked to what he termed the 
‘quick yielding sector[s of] mining and agriculture’, it was clear that ZANU(PF) was 
constructing its social base – both for the elections and for its future development 
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vision – as one built around reconstructed agricultural and mining sectors, combined 
with the informal sector activities of the urban areas. In addition to the party’s rural 
supporters and those in the informal mining sector, this vision also found some resonance 
among the 47% youth who were unemployed in the urban areas, 69  particularly, as 
discussed below, in light of the disappointing performance of the MDCs in the Inclusive 
Government. 
 
In sum, the ZANU(PF) electoral strategy in 2013 clearly moved away from its dominant 
reliance on violence in the June 2008 run-off, although selective coercion, intimidation 
and the memory of the 2008 events were not absent in this round. A combination of 
coercion, consent and political blockages in the context of a reconstituted social base 
served to provide the MDCs with a formidable political challenge.70 Moreover, the 
divisions and party disorganisation of ZANU(PF)’s 2008 campaign were dealt with 
through a much tighter party organisation and election campaign run, as Tendi 
observes, by a ‘network of party ofﬁcials, youth and retired military ofﬁcers who 
fought in Zimbabwe’s liberation war.71 
 
The shock of the 2008 defeat in conditions of severe economic crisis, and the lifeline 
thrown to the party by the GPA, provided a decisive jolt to Mugabe and his party, along 
with the realisation that they could not get away with another violent 2008-style election 
campaign, whatever their continued reliance on the long memories of fear and violence in 
the Zimbabwean electorate. 
 
The Limitations of the MDCs 
When the MDC was formed in 1999, it grew from a broad-based social movement that 
had emerged from a combination of trade union, constitutional reform and human 
rights-based activism. It developed a language of democratisation that combined the 
discourses of these different but connected threads of protest and struck at one of the 
weakest points of the politics of the party of liberation, ZANU(PF). From the late 
1990s into the 2000s, this political formation brought together an alliance of 
movements and social forces and led the debate for political reform in the country. Thus 
this party grew organically from emergent social forces that also provided strong 
intellectual arguments for developing a force capable of confronting and defeating the 
hegemony of the ruling party. As the novelist NoViolet Bulawayo describes it, the word 
change was in the air and it felt like something you could ‘grab and put in your mouth 
and sink your teeth into’.72 However, the united MDC also had its weaknesses, which 
included underdeveloped organisational structures, lack of leadership accountability 
and a growing culture of intra-party violence deployed within the context of a growing 
factionalism within the party. These issues and others led to a split in the party in 2005.73 
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The party also faced a constant barrage of political and legal attacks, as well as repeated 
bouts of electoral violence from the ZANU(PF) state. 
 
Importantly, the MDC’s discourse on democratisation and broadly neo-liberal economic 
programmes, backed by western countries, was always found wanting, against the 
redistributive logic of ZANU(PF)’s land reform process, the ideological legacies of the 
liberation movement, and the discourse of state sovereignty. Notwithstanding these 
obstacles the two MDC formations continued to ﬁght elections and, in 2008, against 
great odds, they defeated ZANU(PF) at the polls, with Mugabe also losing the ﬁrst round 
of the presidential election to Tsvangirai. As a result of horrendous state-led violence, the 
MDCs were prevented from translating this electoral victory into state power, and the 
ruling party retained its incumbency, at this point through the sheer force of the state. 
 
Under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that 
continued to control the coercive arms of the state and persistently blocked key reforms in 
the agreement, despite repeated demands to implement these reforms. The lack of 
experience in the face of ZANU(PF)’s abuse of statecraft quickly exposed the MDCs’ 
weaknesses, as did other factors such as the inability of the two formations to work 
together under the Inclusive Government, leadership indiscretions, growing corruption 
particularly at local government level, and a failure on the part of the MDC to claim its 
successes in the face of ZANU(PF)’s monopoly control of the electronic media. 74                                                                                     
The radical changes in Zimbabwe’s political economy in the 2000s as discussed above, 
and particularly the reconﬁguration of the MDCs’ urban social base, drastically weakened 
the support base of the MDC-T in particular, and the combination of trade union activists 
and the urban middle class that in the 1990s could bring the country to a standstill was no 
longer available in such numbers for political mobilisation. The effects of economic 
demobilisation and massive diasporisation further whittled away the strength of these 
social forces.75  
 
Both MDCs have begun the process of assessing the implications of the recent defeat 
and the prospects of another long-term struggle. In addition to claims of fraud in the 
recent election, the MDC-T pointed to a number of internal problems that weakened 
their challenge. These included: elite capture of the party by the Standing Committee; 
absence of intelligence; failure to implement agreed positions; failure to follow up on  
issues; absence of respect, trust, communication, proper plans generally, clear 
fundraising plans, and a clear campaign strategy; the need to reconnect with civil 
society; dysfunctional provincial structures; the need for a new paradigm; the lack of 
party discipline; the need to discard idioms and mannerisms that alienated the support 
base; the need to transform from a movement to a political party; the need to deliver 
and show difference of performance in local governance.76 All these issues point to a 
party that has not been able to strengthen its organisational and strategic framework 
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against a repressive regime that has constantly harassed its leadership and structures, 
and deployed state violence against its members and supporters. 
 
Since 2009, these weaknesses have eroded the support of both MDCs, as was evident 
from opinion polls carried out in 2012, which showed a drop in support for the MDCs 
and Tsvangirai and an upsurge in popularity for Mugabe and his party. 77  These 
weaknesses and, of particular importance to the election campaign, the failure of the two 
MDC formations to develop an electoral pact in 2013, resulted in the loss of several seats 
to ZANU(PF) due to a split vote. In Matabeleland South, 8 of the 13 seats were lost to 
ZANU(PF) because of this factor, while in Matabeleland North a united opposition would 
have won 11 of the 13 seats instead of which ZANU(PF) won 7 out of the 13. A further 4 
seats were lost to a split vote in Kwekwe, Zvishavane, Masvingo and Kadoma.78  
 
The smaller MDC formation led by Welshman Ncube, with a small support base largely in 
certain areas Matabeleland, was faced with a steady erosion of its support base throughout 
the period of the Inclusive Government. Though the strong performance of its leaders 
in ministerial portfolios was widely acknowledged, the continued effects of the split in 
the united MDC in 2005 and the dynamics of ethnic and regional politics in Zimbabwe 
ensured that its membership ﬁgures remained minimal. Attempts to bring the two 
formations into an electoral pact failed, both in 2008 and 2013, as a result of a failure to 
agree on the allocation of parliamentary and council seats, disagreement over the 
principles for such an arrangement, and the persistent tensions between the leaderships 
of the two formations. In the discussions around an attempt to bring the two into an 
electoral alliance in 2013, the smaller MDC formation ﬁnally took the position that it 
would rather fail in its attempt to establish a regional support base than enter another 
fruitless negotiation with the MDC-T over such an alliance.79 Together these factors 
meant that the MDCs were a much weaker force in 2013 than they were in 2008. 
 
Regional and International Factors 
For SADC, and South Africa in particular, the major priority in settling the 
Zimbabwean crisis was to ensure stabilisation, not democratisation.80 In practice this 
meant that despite the persistent calls from the regional body and the South African 
facilitation team for the full implementation of the GPA prior to elections, there was 
little evidence, beyond diplomatic exhortations, that the organisation was willing or able 
to take further actions. Thus, in the face of ZANU(PF)’s unwillingness to fully implement 
the GPA reforms, SADC eventually settled for minimal electoral reforms, a new 
constitution and the absence of the levels of violence that marred the 2008 elections. 
Guided by liberation movement solidarity with ZANU(PF) and the need to stabilise the 
political situation with the support of the political– military establishment in 
Zimbabwe, Zuma blinked in the face of Mugabe’s humiliating affront to South Africa, 
and SADC took what can only be described as a supine position on the electoral outcome. 
The MDC-T’s comment on the SADC election report clearly expressed its dissatisfaction 
                                                 
77 See Freedom House, ‘Change and “New” Politics in Zimbabwe’, Harare, 18 August 2012. 
78 Solidarity Peace Trust, ‘The End of a Road’, p. 37. 
79 Author’s discussions with members of the leadership of Ncube’s MDC in June 2013. 
80 For a fuller discussion of this see Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the GPA’. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
18 
 
with the regional position: ‘The report sets a very petrifying precedent for SADC if this 
is the quality of observation that is satisfactory for the region’.81  
 
With regard to international forces, the SADC facilitation effectively kept them at bay 
with their response to the Inclusive Government moving between a range of 
positions including nominal support for the process, humanitarian assistance for the 
Inclusive Government and a continuation of a sanctions regime, though with a gradual 
move away from this policy by the EU. In the aftermath of the election, though not lifting 
sanctions completely, the EU took another step in this direction by lifting the strictures 
against the government of Zimbabwe’s Mining Development Corporation. Belgium, the 
centre of global diamond trading, welcomed the move.82 The US on the  other  hand,  
who  noted  the ‘deep ﬂaws’ in the election process, stated its commitment to maintain 
the targeted sanctions.83 For the present, the strategy of the western countries appears to 
be a wait-and-see approach in the hope that the Mugabe government will tone down its 
indigenisation policy and anti-western rhetoric, gradually move towards a greater 
rapprochement with the international ﬁnancial institutions, and in so doing provide a 
face-saving opportunity to engage more fully with the regime. 
 
The End of an Era 
It is fair to conclude that the politics of political and civic opposition that emerged in the 
late 1990s and continued through the ﬁrst 13 years of the 2000s has come to an end in its 
current form. The political and economic conditions that gave rise to its emergence have 
changed substantially and the social forces that have emerged, as discussed above, pose 
new challenges for party and civic organisation and mobilisation. The vast numbers of 
new smallholder farmers, the small-scale informal artisanal miners and the growing 
informalisation of the urban economy will demand different political interventions. 
This shift in the political terrain has already been registered in the language of the newest 
political opposition to emerge on the Zimbabwean scene. In September 2013, the 
NCA transformed itself into a political party under the same name. For much of the 
year preceding the 2013 election its leader, Lovemore Madhuku, had been taking 
political positions closer to that of ZANU(PF). Thus, it came as little surprise when he 
announced that his new party would have ‘nothing to do with the west and we 
respect the liberation struggle. Our party would be nationalist and pan-Africanist’.84 
This shift in the discourse of the former constitutional movement is a clear 
indication that for those considering a future in opposition politics in Zimbabwe, 
the domain of what is considered an acceptable oppositional discourse has 
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already been strongly delineated by the renewed political domination  of  ZANU(PF). 
The constraints of this delineation are likely to change in the future as ZANU(PF) 
faces renewed challenges, but for the current political conjuncture this is a reminder 
of the major shift that has taken place in the country’s politics. 
 
For SADC, the 2013 elections provided the opportunity the organisation needed to 
move the regional body away from its decade-long concern over the Zimbabwe crisis.  In 
the absence of a repeat of the 2008 electoral violence, SADC took a minimalist position 
on free and peaceful, though not necessarily fair, elections. As outlined elsewhere, the 
SADC facilitation, and the position of the South African facilitator as set out by 
former President Mbeki, was from the early 2000s much more concerned with 
stabilisation than democratisation in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding early statements 
from the new South African President Jacob Zuma, the Mbeki paradigm on 
Zimbabwe for the most part remained the template for the Zuma administration. The 
dilemma of the regional bloc in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis has been well 
described by Palotti. He writes that SADC’s attempts to put an end to human rights 
abuses in Zimbabwe have been hampered by ‘SADC’s inability to draw a clear distinction 
between respect for human rights and the promotion of a neo-liberal strategy of 
economic development’. 85  He further observes that SADC’s diplomatic efforts were 
caught between the redistributive nationalist rhetoric of an authoritarian regime that 
trampled on human rights in the name of pursuing social justice, and the 
instrumentality of human rights in the neo-liberal development paradigm of the west. 
Thus, having embraced the latter, SADC failed to address both the colonial legacies of 
inequality in the region, and the upholding of human rights in southern Africa.86  
 
The failure to deal with this distinction can be seen most clearly in a recent statement 
on the Zimbabwean elections by Thabo Mbeki, who played a key role in the SADC 
facilitation in Zimbabwe. Not prepared to examine the tensions between neo-
liberalism and human rights, Mbeki’s current position has simply replicated the 
ZANU(PF) position. Going back on his past criticisms of the modality of Zimbabwe’s 
land reform process, Mbeki now proclaims that he erred in his advice to Mugabe. He 
further declared: 
 
So the Zimbabweans have been in the frontline in terms of defending our right as 
Africans to determine our future, and they are paying the price for that. I think it is 
our responsibility as African intellectuals to join them, the Zimbabweans, to say 
No!87  
 
Mbeki’s position should be seen as part of the ways in which, as Hart shows, the ‘liberation 
linked articulations of nationalism’ remain central to the ways in which the ‘successive 
ruling blocs’ in the ANC ‘deﬁne the terms on which wide arrays of struggle and 
contestation take place’. Moreover, Hart’s analysis shows the ways in which this 
‘renationalisation’ of political discourse has taken place within the context of a 
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denationalisation of the economy, bringing with it enormous challenges for the South 
African ruling party.88 Mbeki’s position and the renationalisation of political discourse 
in South Africa express the concerns of liberation movements in the region over the 
challenges to the sovereignty of ‘their’ states in the face of perceived western arrogance 
and opposition towards ‘African solutions to African problems’. The long-term 
implications of this discourse on the politics of the region remain to be seen. However, if 
the authoritarian legacy of ZANU(PF)’s rule is simply elided in the euphoria of a selective 
pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, then the complex challenges that the 
Zimbabwe crisis raised are not likely to be more fully understood. In that case, instead 
of confronting the difﬁcult challenges of linking a radical redistributive economic 
programme to a progressive democratic political agenda, the latter will simply be subsumed 
under the former, and the result will be an impoverished left formalism. The continued 
struggle for a broad democratic agenda remains an urgent task in southern Africa. 
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